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Review*
In the preface to his book Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance - The Case 
for Common Law Pejovich states that the book is about capitalism and its economic per-
formance. He describes capitalism as the “only system in recorded history that has been 
successful in pulling the average person above the subsistence level and sustaining a ste-
ady, if cyclical, rate of economic development”. However, Pejovich adds that his book is 
not concerned with advocating capitalism on philosophical or ideological grounds. Rather, 
his purpose is to explain why the system has done so well. In order to do so, the analysis 
goes in two directions: 1) analysis of the incentive effects of formal and informal institu-
tions on the economic behaviour of individuals or, put differently, analysis of the effects 
of capitalist rules on the game itself, and 2) examination of adjustments in the rules over 
time. In his analysis Pejovich differentiates two major types of capitalism - Anglo-Ame-
rican and Continental, whereby he focuses on the two legal systems upon which the two 
types depend - common and civil law. His goal is to explain how and why different ver-
sions of capitalism have led to different socioeconomic results.
The book is organized in three parts: 1) Basic economic concepts (chapters 1-2), 2) 
Transformation of medieval community into modern society: the rise of classical libera-
lism, the rule of law and capitalism (chapters 3-9), and 3) Toward a theory of institutio-
nal change (chapters 10-15). In the first part the author discusses some basic economic 
concepts, transaction costs, the role of institutions, and the meaning of economic effici-
ency. The author defines informal institutions as “traditions, customs, moral values, reli-
gious beliefs and all the other norms of behaviour that have emerged spontaneously, sur-
vived the test of time and served to bind generations”. Formal institutions are “constitu-
tions, statutes, common laws and other governmental regulations”. As the author states, 
the major premise of the book is that the changes in institutions affect the economy, and 
that changes in the economy have predictable effects on the development and modifica-
tions of institutions. To readers who are unfamiliar with the main concepts of institutio-
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nal economics, the fist part of this book will provide a good introduction. It is written in 
textbook style - simple and informative.
At the beginning of the second part the author briefly discusses the birth of capitali-
sm and its dependence on the rule of law. He also stresses the importance of individua-
lism, which “rewards competitive performance, promotes risk taking and views income 
inequalities as desirable results of entrepreneurship and free trade”. Apart from the rule 
of law and the culture of individualism, the third cornerstone of capitalism is competiti-
ve markets. The author also writes about the judiciary, constitutions and private proper-
ty rights. Furthermore, he relates the incentive effects of the institutions of capitalism to 
economic performance. The four basic institutions of capitalism are, according to the au-
thor, private property rights, the law of contract, an independent judiciary and a consti-
tution. They are all embodied in the rule of law. The second part of the book also conta-
ins a reprint of Buchanan’s paper “Afraid to be free: dependency as desideratum”. In the 
third part Pejovich proposes and develops “a theory of efficiently-friendly institutional 
changes that are consistent with both the culture of capitalism and sustainable economic 
development”. The theory is based on three major factors: the rule of law, the carriers of 
change (individuals), and the interaction between formal and informal institutions. The 
gist of the theory (the interaction thesis) is that the rule of law provides incentives for the 
carriers of change to narrow the gap between the culture of capitalism and the prevailing 
culture in the community. Pejovich actually attempts to introduce culture into the model 
of institutional changes.
There are several things worth pointing out regarding Pejovich’s views. Firstly, he 
believes that, contrary to the English and American experiences, the “role of a powerful 
state has never been seriously questioned on the European continent, not even by its pro-
minent classical liberals”. In Anglo-American capitalism the government is a predator 
which the rule of law is to tame, and in Continental capitalism the government is a par-
tner in the economic game. Secondly, the author stresses that an expansion of the role of 
the state in economic affairs makes the economy less efficient. In the overregulated Eu-
ropean Union phenomena like Bill Gates and John Dell are not happening. Thirdly, Con-
tinental capitalism privileges social justice over freedom of choice, while in Anglo-Ame-
rican capitalism the system is about freedom of choice and private property rights. Ge-
nerally, according to Pejovich, Anglo-American capitalism is better at protecting the in-
stitutions of capitalism.
Fourthly, Pejovich makes a clear distinction between common law and civil law. Co-
mmon law is judge-made law, the institutionalization of informal institutions, and it is 
about “individual liberty, private property rights and free exchange”. Common law jud-
ges can choose either to stick with the prevailing precedents or to ignore them and “legi-
slate from the bench”. This means that the judges have discretionary power to make deci-
sions that are not consistent with either the wisdom of the past or existing procedures. In 
civil law countries legislators debate scholars’ propositions and enact those that pass their 
scrutiny. Bureaucrats and courts then implement and enforce new formal rules. Further-
more, the legislative process is influenced by various interest groups. In common law co-
untries formal rules appear spontaneously from within the system as a response to chan-
ges in the requirements of the game. “Those adjustments in formal rules reduce the tran-
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saction costs of exploiting new exchange opportunities and, in doing so, move resources 
to higher-valued uses”. Formal rules in civil law countries are also made in response to 
changes in the game, but legislators have incentives to enact formal rules that promise to 
push human interactions towards the results desired by a majority of voters, the median 
voter, rent-seeking groups, or all of these. Pejovich believes that the transaction costs of 
merging the two legal systems are very high. 
Let us now analyze the author’s views, starting from the role of the state. Is the dif-
ference between Anglo-American and the Continental capitalism regarding that issue re-
ally that strong? Reisman (2008) points out several things about the United States. Fir-
stly, government spending in the United States currently equals more than forty percent 
of national income, and that is without counting any of the massive off-budget spending 
(e.g. recent bailouts). According to Reisman’s view, this means that more than forty do-
llars of every one hundred dollars of output are appropriated by government against the 
will of the citizens who produce that output. Secondly, in the US there are presently fif-
teen federal cabinet departments and more than one hundred federal agencies and com-
missions. Thirdly, in 2007 the Federal Register contained fully seventy-three thousand 
pages of detailed government regulations, which is an increase of more than ten thousand 
since the late 1970s. Apart from that, there is a massive apparatus of laws, departments, 
agencies and regulations at the state and local level. It is also questionable that in Europe 
government is viewed as a partner in the economic game. This is too general. It is highly 
likely that entrepreneurs in Europe have an opposite view of the state. Also, a powerful 
state has never been accepted in Switzerland, and it was quite successfully challenged by 
leading German liberals such as Kant and von Humboldt. Furthermore, recently a fiscal 
stimulus of $787bn was approved in the US, although not backed up by the Republicans, 
showing that government in the US might not be generally viewed as a predator.
Pejovich uses the Index of Economic Freedom to assess whether Anglo-American 
or Continental capitalism is better at protecting the institutions of capitalism.1 It turns out 
that economic freedom is higher in Anglo-American capitalism, i.e. common law coun-
tries. In 2007 the index for common law countries on a scale from zero to 100 was 81.3, 
and for civil law countries 72.7. The first group of countries consists of the United Sta-
tes, England, Ireland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In these countries common 
law is the dominant legal system. In the second group (all western countries, in a cultural 
sense, that use civil law) are Portugal, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, 
Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Denmark. Pejovich left out Greece be-
cause it was dominated by the Ottoman Empire for centuries, Finland because “it has re-
mained between the West and the East”, and Norway because it uses both common law 
and civil law. Hong Kong and Singapore are left out “because it is not clear whether they 
are part of Western civilization”. 
There are several problematic issues regarding Pejovich’s analysis by using the Index 
of Economic Freedom. He acknowledges that it is not a perfect measure. However, it is 
1 Economic freedom is defined as that part of freedom that is concerned with the material autonomy of the indi-
vidual in relation to the state and other organized groups (Heritage Foundation, 2008). The Index takes into account 
ten “variables”: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment 
freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption and labour freedom. 
116
S. Pejovich: Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance – the Case for Common Law
Financial Theory and Practice 33 (1) 113-118 (2009.)
still the only one he uses. In addition, is the difference between 81.3 and 72.7 so significant 
for the conclusion of the superiority of Anglo-American capitalism to be made? Even the 
author’s interpretation of which countries are included and which are not is a bit fuzzy. If 
the author mentions Hong Kong and Singapore, which have the highest index score, how 
come he does not mention India, which modelled its legal system on England’s and yet 
had an index for 2007 of 54.1? In general, what about the Asian countries? This especi-
ally holds for China, a country that achieved high economic growth despite its weak rule 
of law (index score in 2007 was 51.8). Another problem with using the Index of Econo-
mic Freedom is that it does not cover a long time period; it starts from 1996. It is highly 
possible that forty years ago some continental countries, such as West Germany or Swit-
zerland, provided more economic freedom than the UK, Ireland or New Zealand. Finally, 
Pejovich fails to notice that there is a strong correlation between a country’s GDP p.c. and 
the index score (see graph 1). In other words, countries that are richer have more econo-
mic freedom. It is not necessary for those countries to have a legal system based on com-
mon law. Pejovich also fails to notice the possibility of reverse causality: maybe countri-
es have more economic freedom because they are richer, and not vice versa.
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Source: Heritage Foundation (2008) and World Bank (2008); author’s analysis.
Let us now focus on the common law vs. civil law issue. One endnote contains 
Colombatto’s argument that in civil law countries precedent is becoming more and more 
important in many public administration cases, where judges can interpret the law as they 
like but are under pressure to justify differences with respect to previous, similar cases. 
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Furthermore, Pejovich mentions several times, but casually, that the difference between 
common law and civil law is not black and white. The former does rely on statutes and 
the latter does pay attention to previous courts’ decisions. The difference lies in the re-
lative importance of the two models in making formal rules. If the distinction between 
those two legal systems is not that large, why push the common law argument that hard? 
Weber (1972:471) claimed that England became economically successful not because of 
its legal system, but partly despite of it. Namely, only the propertied classes had access 
to the royal courts, which used the common law, while everybody else was “sentenced” 
to Khadi-justice, or completely denied justice. This changed in the course of the 20th cen-
tury. In addition, Posner (1998:2) claims that some American states, which have highly 
politicized judiciaries of questionable professional competence, are nevertheless econo-
mically successful. Pejovich’s argument that the legal process in Europe is influenced by 
rent-seeking groups, while in the US it is not, simply does not hold. Why does the strong 
lobbying industry in the US even exist? Furthermore, Lele and Siems (2006) have shown 
that, in contrast to earlier research, there is no legal distinction regarding shareholder 
protection in civil law and common law countries. Moreover, Pejovich’s view that legal 
systems based on civil law are typically worse at taking into account informal instituti-
ons than legal systems based on common law could also be challenged. See for example 
Pawlowski’s (1999) book on judicial decision making, especially regarding interpreting 
the shared legal rules in different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. The judges took into 
account informal institutions when making their decisions. Finally, the author does not 
differentiate between the subcategories of civil law: scholars of comparative law usually 
subdivide civil law into three groups: German, French, and Scandinavian civil law. 
Pejovich’s interaction thesis is worth quoting: “When the members of the community 
perceive the consequences of a new formal rule to be in conflict with their prevailing cul-
ture, the transaction costs of integrating that rule into the institutional framework will be 
high, consume more resources, and reduce the production of wealth. The actual economic 
outcome is the joint product of the interaction of a new rule with the prevailing informal 
rules.” In order to prove his thesis Pejovich just compares the Index of Economic Free-
dom scores for central and east European countries, but he divides them in two groups: 
those with greater Western influence and those with lesser Western influence. The former 
have a higher average of the index which, according to Pejovich, is “striking” evidence 
in support of the interaction thesis. Countries with more Western influence had stronger 
institutional restructuring. In other words, countries where collectivism and egalitariani-
sm were less widespread could more easily accept the institutions of capitalism. Although 
the interaction thesis is interesting, it is not new. By now it has become almost conventi-
onal wisdom, which was not true at the beginning of transition. It is a pity that Pejovich 
did not study transition economies and their legal systems in more detail. 
Most of Pejovich’s basic ideas, especially those about institutional changes, are di-
fficult to disagree with. However, Pejovich oversimplifies matters. Despite the author’s 
intention not to defend capitalism on ideological grounds, some conclusions in the book 
that are not well supported by empirical evidence might be interpreted as doing just this. 
The author of this review has to put the essential question regarding the general idea of 
this book: what is the point in proving that common law is better than civil law, espe-
118
S. Pejovich: Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance – the Case for Common Law
Financial Theory and Practice 33 (1) 113-118 (2009.)
cially because with time there seems to be a convergence between them? Many would 
argue that countries are path-dependent; they have to work with what they have got. Also, 
the author neglects other possible determinants of economic growth, apart from institu-
tions (see e.g. Temple, 1999). Finally, in his analysis Pejovich focuses on several coun-
tries which are probably clear-cut examples of common law or civil law systems. But in 
between, there are many other countries which do not fit, and each of them has its own 
specifics. In the words of the Raconteurs, who are an American rock band, “there’s so 
many shades of black”.
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